On the Dichotomy of Divinity and Humanity in Jewish Law

Abstract

Jewish law1 does not take formal cognizance of any “rights”. The modern Hebrew term for right, Zekhut, does not occur in the Bible; and in talmudic literature it bears various meanings, such as innocence,2 blamelessness,3 merit,4 preference,5 reward,6 but never the meaning of formal right.7 It is true that the modern Hebrew terms for “obligation” and “duty”, Hiyuv and Hova,are likewise unknown to biblical parlance; but while there is not in biblical or talmudic language any substitute for the missing concept of right, both Bible and Talmud abound, of course, with equivalents for duty, especially the Mitzva (command). Indeed, Jewish law is a system of duties: the service and worship of God is its general and overriding purpose, and as all law is God’s law, it is self-evident that the duty to obey God is paramount.8 The purpose and import of divine law cannot be the creation and protection of human rights: the rights of human beings may well be part and parcel of the divine creation, like their bodies and souls and their lives, but the object of divine law can only be to establish divine rights and impose on human beings the corresponding duties. The conferment of rights by divine law can only be a consequence incidental to compliance with duties: the imposition on a human being of a duty towards another human being implies the creation of a collateral right vested in that other person, irrespective of whether the performance of that duty is an obligation toward God only or also directly enforceable by earthly judicial process.KeywordsThirteenth CenturyFourteenth CenturyDivine CommandCapital OffenseRabbinical AuthorityThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.