Abstract
The paper considers environmental planning arrangements under which central government ministers may be asked to confirm or deny an environmental agency's desire to control some environment-threatening action. It is argued that such arrangements, if they are to be sustainable, must allow ministers to make decisions that limit the political damage to themselves. Conditions which allow this are discussed. This leads to the formulation of five different environmental planning arrangements, three of which allow decision making that limits political damage. These three sustainable arrangements are exemplified by procedures that are operated in Britain, whereas the two non-sustainable arrangements are not.
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