On the cost of reducing the interaction in interactive proof protocols: Shlomo Moran: Department of Computer Science, Israel Institute of Technology, Haifa, Nov. 1986

Abstract

Problems linked to tax injustices have gained worldwide attention recently, as the aggressive tax planning practices of multinational companies have increasingly been exposed. Legislative reforms and enhanced corporate social responsibility practices have been introduced to deter tax avoidance, yet with little enduring success. However, little attention has been paid to the role of tax scholarship or to the statutory interpretation in the problems of tax avoidance. This paper contradicts the commonplace view that tax law scholarship serves the public interest. The paper approaches tax scholarship as a social practice, and argues that conflicting interests emerge when tax scholars conduct doctrinal study of law. As many tax scholars work for the tax advisory industry alongside their scholarly jobs, they have an incentive to propose legal arguments in their scholarly work that advance their private clients’ interests. Since judges use scholarship as an interpretive aid when defining the content of tax law, tax scholarship might bias the development of legal doctrine. It is argued that scholarship may therefore change the distributive effects of tax systems, in favor of the tax advisory firms’ clients. As a result, the democratic legitimacy of tax systems may be undermined. This article illustrates the problematic aspects of tax scholars’ double roles using empirical examples from Finnish legal culture and Finnish law reviews and codes of conduct in universities. This paper develops an argument that if such problems are prevalent in a country with little corruption and strong democratic institutions, they may be widespread in jurisdictions beyond Finland.