On the Contestability of Social and Political Concepts

Abstract

tHE AIM OF THIS PAPER is to explore some of the philosophical problems generated by recent attempts to develop systematically the thesis that certain of the centrally important concepts of social and political thought have an essentially contested character. My investigation has two phases. First, after making some brief, exploratory remarks about the origin and sense of the notion of an essentially contested concept, I try to display some of the initial plausibility and explanatory power of the thesis that some, if not all, of the chief concepts of social and political theory are essentially contested concepts, to identify some of the variants in which an essential contestability thesis may be advanced, and to specify some of the difficulties, ambiguities, and weaknesses inherent in each of these variants. Second, I try to sketch an understanding of essential contestability which avoids the difficulties of previous conceptions while preserving their explanatory power and philosophical interest. I conclude by indicating how the philosophical research program generated by this revised account shows that recent attempts to deny the autonomy of political philosophy are misconceived, and