Abstract
Jurisprudents often conceive their task as requiring investigating “the concept of law.” What is, however, the concept of “(the) concept of law”? What do legal philosophers do when they investigate the concept of law? What do legal philosophers mean when they set for the concept of law? Is conceptual analysis—apparently, the primary tool for any search about the concept of law—a useful instrument for jurisprudential enquiries? The chapter purports to cast some light on these issues by way of a meta-philosophical investigation.
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