Abstract
A new approach has been proposed to analyze the strategy-switching dynamics in a discrete model or a non-cooperative game with the following characteristics: (i) the agents are motivated by absolute payoffs rather than relative ones; (ii) the payoffs vary as the composition of the population changes; (iii) the agents are boundedly rational in the sense that they can only predict the outcomes of their own actions. Rich dynamic phenomena are exhibited for such discrete dynamic models or games. The approach is then applied to explore the relative-profitability of price-taking behavior in a quantity-competing heterogeneous oligopoly.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
