Abstract
Abstract In this essay, Landmann-Kalischer takes aim at “subjectivist” approaches to aesthetics, according to which, one, beauty is not a property of objects but is something we project onto objects, and, two, aesthetic experience involves judgments that are not cognitive but expressive of how a subject feels. Against these views, she defends a realist view of beauty to the effect that beauty is a response-dependent property of an object. She also advances a cognitivist-hedonist view about aesthetic experience to the effect that we make cognitive judgments about the beauty of objects on the basis of a feeling of pleasure they bring about in us. In order to make her argument, Landmann-Kalischer deploys a secondary quality analogy in which she likens beauty and our aesthetic judgments about it to secondary qualities (like colors) and our sensory judgments about them.
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