On the Characterization of Cognitive Progress

Abstract

In this paper I shall discuss cognitive progress in terms of belief systems, and take “cognitive progress” to mean progressive changes in belief systems or the progressive development of beliefs. This discussion can easily be translated into talk about progress in science or about progressive theory changes; I prefer to speak about belief systems becuse of the great generality of this notion. By a “belief system” I understand a set of propositions (or beliefs) together with a system of evidential relationships among these propositions, in other words, a potential description of what some person might believe in some situation. I do not assume that belief systems have to be consistent or logically closed. Progressive changes are obviously changes which improve a belief system and make it more satisfactory than it was earlier. The evaluation of belief systems and judgments of cognitive progress depend of course on the assumed objectives of belief formation. In the history of methodology, we can find at least two “classical” theories (or types of theories) of cognitive progress, which may be termed the accumulation theory and the convergence theory.2 According to both theories, belief formation has essentially one main goal which may be termed the Truth.