Abstract

We take the axiomatic approach to uncover the structure of the revenue-sharing problem from broadcasting sports leagues. We formalize two notions of impartiality, depending on the stance one takes with respect to the revenue generated in the games involving each pair of teams. We show that the resulting two axioms lead towards two broad categories of rules, when combined with additivity and some other basic axioms. We complement those results strengthening the impartiality notions to consider axioms of order preservation.

Highlights

  • In a recent paper (Bergantiños and Moreno-Ternero 2020a), we have introduced a formal model to analyze the problem of sharing the revenues from broadcasting sports leagues among participating teams, based on the audiences they generate

  • We show that equal treatment of equals, additivity and maximum aspirations characterize the so-called EC-family of rules, which is made of compromises between two rules that stand out as focal to solve this problem

  • The combination of this axiom with additivity, weak equal treatment of equals and any axiom from the group made of maximum aspirations, non-negativity and weak upper bound characterizes a new family of rules

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Summary

Introduction

In a recent paper (Bergantiños and Moreno-Ternero 2020a), we have introduced a formal model to analyze the problem of sharing the revenues from broadcasting sports leagues among participating teams (clubs), based on the audiences they generate. We consider the axiom stand-alone pair, which states that in situations where only the games involving a pair of teams have a positive audience, the total audience should be allocated to such a pair of teams The combination of this axiom with additivity, weak equal treatment of equals and any axiom from the group made of maximum aspirations, non-negativity and weak upper bound characterizes a new family of rules. The combination of additivity, home (respectively, away) order preservation, stand-alone pair and any of the three bounds axioms, characterizes one half of the family of split rules: those that impose a fixed split of the audience of each game between the two playing teams, but guaranteeing at least (respectively, at most) one half to the local team. For a smooth passage we defer all proofs to an appendix

The model
Axioms
With weak equal treatment of equals
With weak order preservation
Discussion
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