Abstract
In this letter, we propose an auction-based resource trading scheme between a network service provider (NSP) and multiple content providers (CPs). The NSP is in charge of a number of small-cell base stations (SBSs), while each CP provides content downloading services to its affiliated mobile users (MUs). By treating the SBSs as a kind of resources, the NSP leases SBSs to the CPs for caching their popular contents, thereby reducing the downloading latency of the MUs. We first establish the utility functions of the NSP and CPs. Then, we maximize the utilities of both sides by formulating an iterative auction problem, in which the NSP (auctioneer) communicates with the CPs (bidders) in an iterative manner for achieving optimal price and resource allocations. Furthermore, to avoid being cheated from the CPs, we adopt an ascending-bid auction mechanism such that the CPs do not have motivations to cheat the NSP for a lower price. Numerical results show that our proposed scheme can effectively allocate SBSs to the CPs and prevent each CP from cheating the NSP for gaining a higher profit.
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