Abstract
Wage bargaining may formally be treated as decision problems among two parties with different utility functions. The decision consists of determining the increase of the wage rate for the time of the tariff contract commonly accepted by the both tariff parties representing the employers and the employees respectively. So far, on principle, the same solution methods of the game and the bargaining theory can be applied to such decision situations as they come into question for multi-person decision problems in organisations (Fandel 1979, Fandel 1981). However, because of the special problem structure in the case of wage bargaining one may restrict mainly to cooperative solution concepts without side payments.
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