Abstract
In 2010, Fan et al. first introduced the concept of anonymous multi-receiver identity-based encryption (AMRIBE). They used the concept of Fujisaki–Okamoto transformation (F.O. transformation) to support their proof in random oracle models. Recently, many works on this topic have been proposed. Most of them adopted Fujisaki–Okamoto transformation to achieve the indistinguishability of encryptions under multi-ID, chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-MID-CCA) security. However, we find out that these schemes do not gain anonymity against insider attacks. In this manuscript, we use a sequence of games to prove that any AMRIBE scheme will fail to gain anonymity under chosen-ciphertext attacks and chosen-plaintext attacks if the IND-MID-CCA security is proven using Fujisaki–Okamoto transformation.
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