Abstract
Imagine the disaster that would befall us philosophers were some supremely evil genius to plunder our vocabulary of such locutions as 'kind of', 'sort of', 'case of', 'falls under', 'is included in' and so on. Thus improverished it seems plain that we should be rendered incapable of realizing many of even our most modest philosophical ambitions. It has been our good fortune, of course, to have been spared such conceptual deprivations. Yet it would be reasonable, would it not, to ask just how well we understand such crucial notions as these? For, if perchance we understand t-hem imperfectly we are scarcely better off than had our evil genius worked his magic. This paper offers an account of two such concepts-the relation of determinate to determinable and the relation of species to genus.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Free) 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
