ON SOME FEATURES OF THE US POLICY IN CENTRAL ASIA

Abstract

An attempt is made in the article to identify and analyze some aspects of the US foreign strategy in Central Asia which, in the authors opinion, although in one form or another are touched upon in the domestic political science, can nevertheless be interpreted from a new angle, subjecting the existing interpretations to a certain re-evaluation and adjustment. Washingtons policy in the region is viewed in a broader context, Central Asia is considered an integral part of Eurasia. The main attention is focused on the justification of the thesis that in the 90s of the last century the United States claimed to be the main actor occupying the dominant position in Eurasia as a whole and Central Asia in particular, but due to a number of factors failed to reach that aim. After analyzing the activities of the US administration in using the territory of the five countries as a springboard for the military operations in Afghanistan, it is concluded that from the beginning of the war until recently, the possibilities of achieving goals sought by Washington in the region gradually narrowed. It is shown that the situation was determined both by Russias return to the region as a great military and political power and emergence of such a new powerful actor as China, as well as by the mistakes and miscalculations of the US leadership.