Abstract
In his recent review of Law and Truth (Duxbury 1999), Neil Duxbury has many complimentary things to say about various aspects of my book (Patterson 1996). He notices that I make an effort to take seriously the positions of those with whom I disagree. He compliments my knowledge of the philosophical work of Wittgenstein, and notices his influence. He even states correctly the question that lies at the heart of the book, "What does it mean to say that a proposition of law is true?" But when it comes to the elaboration and evaluation of my position, Professor Duxbury misunderstands that position, and rather seriously so. I should like to correct this.
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