On Protocols and Fireproof Houses

Abstract

Ever since Canada's government leader in senate, Raoul Dandurand, uttered phrase, We live in a fireproof house, at fifth assembly of League of Nations in 1924, expression has had a special meaning for Canadians. At time, it reflected widely held notion that their country was exceptional. Unlike citizens of Europe, who had yet to discover how to live together in harmony, Canadians had long made peace with their American neighbours, and had thereby constructed for themselves a veritable fireproof house across Atlantic. Thanks to their international behaviour and fortunate geographical location, they would never need to call on international community for military assistance. As such, in spite of their League membership, they felt entitled to a lesser burden when it came to maintaining peace of world beyond their borders. Fifteen years after Dandurand's now infamous remark, outbreak of second World War exposed national illusion for what it was, and soon after Canadians embraced internationalism with a zeal that reflected guilt of their earlier naivete. For a long time, their spirit remained grounded in lessons of past. Of late, however, it appears that these memories have started to fade, and once again, old exceptionalist attitude has become attractive.' No longer about fireproof houses, governing Conservatives call it made-in-Canada approach. And instead of traditional security issues, emphasis is environmental, focusing specifically on obligations stemming from Canada's ratification of Kyoto protocol.Dandurand's speech was a response to a discussion of another protocol, this one named after Swiss city that was home to League of Nations. The League had been founded after First World War to prevent such destruction from ever recurring. Its ioth article, as envisaged by its chief architect, US President Woodrow Wilson, bound members to respect and preserve as against external aggression territorial and existing political independence of all Members of League.2 This commitment to collective security, however, was too much for American leader's constituents to handle. The Democrats fell in 1920 election and United States never joined new world organization. Its neighbour to north, equally hesitant about article 10, made a different choice. The government in Ottawa viewed its independent membership in League as international appreciation of Canadian contribution to Great War. It gave Canada a voice on world stage, separate from British empire. Moreover, at time that they agreed to participate, Robert Borderis Conservatives had yet to discover American change of heart. The decision to become a League member was therefore relatively easy.Giving full-fledged support to implications of a system of collective security was more difficult. With America now on outside, successive Canadian governments, Conservative and Liberal, actively campaigned to minimize their commitments under article 10. In League's early years, Canadian representatives began lobbying to eliminate article altogether; when that failed, they attempted instead to limit commitment of member states based on geography. Canada, they suggested, should not be obligated to sacrifice its citizens to prevent escalation of conflicts in faraway Europe. A 1923 resolution to this end failed by one vote (unanimity was required for implementation), but its impact was clear. Canada had gained, in words of historian F.H. Soward, the satisfaction of feeling that support given her interpretation was sufficiently strong to influence procedure of Council, if in future it should be called upon to act.3 The power of League had been seriously curtailed.This result was problematic in western Europe. France in particular sought another means of ensuring international support in case of a German attack. …