On Nasser and His Legacy

Abstract

The purpose of this essay is an examination of some of the fruits of Nasserism, both as a source of particular policies and choices throughout Nasser's political career and as a legacy which impinges upon political choices in post-Nasser Egyptian and Arab politics. While seeking to illuminate the positions and argumentations of the proponents and detractors of the man and his policies, the essay is not intended to arrive at a final and simple judgement concerning Nasserism and its achievements and shortcomings. Given the mixed nature of Nasserism, any such effort is futile and more the domain of legitimate political partisanship and activism rather than that of critical analysis. While the faithful may point to his advocacy of Arab nationalism and his commitment to the welfare of the Egyptian masses, critics are not without an abundance of setbacks to dwell upon: the Yemeni fiasco, which was dubbed Nasser's Vietnam; his many regional quarrels, which consumed his resources and attention; his failure to bring about a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict; the performance of his armies in 1956 and 1967; the failure of his agrarian reform; and his inability to create a durable and viable base of power and legitimacy outside the sheer impact of his charisma. Almost two decades of Nasserist rule did not eradicate the eternal problem of Egyptian poverty and scarcity, and one of his dreams, ambitious in the Egyptian context, of making meat a regular feature of the Egyptian diet, never materialized. It remains a treat for special occassions and holidays. On a different track, his record is equally dismal. As an attempt at ideological change and transformation Nasserism was abortive and the new society that he claimed to be his goal has yet to be built. The feudalistic structure that he inherited may have been weakened, but the cultural bias in favor of class, privilege and status that has always been a part of Egyptian culture is largely intact. New masters have replaced the old, but the masses remain submissive and resigned to their lot. A new generation of officers and technocrats came to power at the expence of landed feudal aristocracy, but the hierarchical vision of the world and the deference toward power and its symbols are still the dominant features of the Egyptian political landscape.1 He flirted with socialism, but in such a context it never really had much of a chance. He tried to undermine tradition, but still had so much reverence for it that his attack did not have sufficient impact and although here and there some dents can be seen, as a whole it is alive and doing quite well. He felt the power of Islamic institutions and values and tried to undermine them in favor of secular schemes, but at best he was only semi-secular himself. In the end, what obtained in Egypt was a compromise between Islamic tradition and Nasserist ideology. An equipoise was arrived at, and Nasser and his leading intellectuals could point to their socialist blueprint as a synthesis of socialism, Islam, and Arab nationalism. An insightful study by Morroe Berger found no serious opposition to Islam on the part of the regime but an attempt to use it 'to buttress nationalism, socialism, and the one-party popular democracy'.2 Quite suggestive indeed is Berger's further assertion that the conditions in Nasser's Egypt may have enhanced rather than weakened the position of religion: 'In such conditions of rapid political change, stress, unachieved goals and denial of Review article