Abstract

We provide a precise account of those assumptions underlying any solution concept à la Nash for bargaining games, that is, based only on the geometry of the set of utility vectors associated with a set of agreements, plus the utilities in case of disagreement, and disregarding any detail concerning the bargaining process and environment. We show that this basically amounts to assuming what we call invariance to isomorphic transformations in the underlying situation. A precise statement of this basic equivalence requires traveling between Nash's classical setup of sets and points and the world of preferences and alternatives underlying it.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: C78.

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