Abstract
In this paper I connect the well known assertion from Kant’s ethical theory that we can never be fully certain about our motivations with his theory of the thing in itself of the self from the first _Critique_ in order to demonstrate that Kant has a theory of the unconscious. I situate this argument in a criticism of Wuerth’s recent interpretation in _Kant on Mind, Action, and Ethics_ and suggest a revision of his notion of immediatism. I gather other information about Kant’s theory of the unconscious and show that, for Kant, the unconscious mind is a privileged site of moral personhood.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
