On modern problems of the mechanism of judges’ responsibility for disciplinary misconduct; law enforcement practice, general approaches. Part 1. Termination of the powers of a judge for a serious offense after the constitutional innovations of 2020 – constitutional or disciplinary responsibility?

Abstract

The article criticizes the current situation regulated by law, in which a gross disciplinary misconduct of a judge, entailing the early termination of his judicial powers, is considered as a measure of disciplinary responsibility. The conclusion is substantiated that the early termination of the powers of a judge for gross misconduct should entail a measure of not disciplinary, but constitutional responsibility. The mechanism of constitutional responsibility of a judge is partially provided for by the constitutional innovations of 2020 only for a little over two thousand judges, and the Federation Council can apply it, which is not typical for a legislative body, and which destroys the unity of the status of judges. The rationale for its development should be based on the premise that a judge’s gross misconduct, which deserves early termination of his powers, is primarily a violation of the judge’s oath, which currently does not provide for any consequences under current legislation and corporate regulation. Appropriate proposals are made with the necessary justifications.