On loopholes, plugs and inevitable leaks: A theory of SSSI protection in Great Britain

Abstract

The conservation of nationally important nature sites in Britain is achieved in part through the designation of Sites of Special Scientific Interest (SSSIs). Under the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981, now bolstered by a 1985 Amendment Act, owners and occupiers proposing to undertake operations listed as potentially damaging in an SSSI notification must inform the Nature Conservancy Council (NCC) of their intention; and they are prevented from carrying out such operations for periods specified in the Act. This enables the NCC to comment and, if it is concerned, to negotiate for the proposal's modification or withdrawal, using where necessary its powers to conclude management agreements under which owners and occupiers may be paid compensation. The paper describes the notification process and seeks to predict the outcomes of conflict cases based on a consideration of NCC and farmer attitudes both in general and in relation to particular cases. It is shown that NCC attitudes have little, if any, effect on the extent to which outcomes are favourable to the NCC. In contrast marked reductions in the outcomes favourable to the NCC result if farmers are ill-disposed to the NCC and very concerned to proceed with their proposals. Outcomes under the 1981 and 1985 Acts are predicted and compared. It is concluded that the proportion of conflict case outcomes favourable to the NCC is increased from 85% under the 1981 Act to over 92% following the implementation of the 1985 Act. Further reduction in the number of damaging proposals proceeded with may best be achieved not by the adoption of stronger powers but by endeavours to increase the proportion of farmers well-disposed to the NCC.