On Logical Foundations of Multilevel Secure Databases

Abstract

It is envisaged that the application of the multilevel security (MLS) scheme will enhance flexibility and effectiveness of authorization policies in shared enterprise databases and will replace cumbersome authorization enforcement practices through complicated view definitions on a per user basis. However, the critical problem with the current model is that the belief a higher security level is cluttered with irrelevant or inconsistent data as no mechanism for attenuation is supported. Critics also argue that it is imperative for MLS database users to theorize about the belief of others, perhaps at different security levels, an apparatus that is currently missing and the absence of which in seriously felt.The impetus for our current research is the need to provide an adequate framework for belief reasoning in MLS databases. In this paper, we show that these concepts can be captured in a F-logic style declarative query language, called MultiLog, for MLS deductive databases for which a proof theoretic, model theoretic and fixpoint semantics exist. This development is significant from a database perspective as it now enables us to compute the semantics of MultiLog databases in a bottom-up fashion. We also define a bottom up procedure to compute unique models of stratified MultiLog databases. Finally, we establish the equivalence of MultiLog's three logical characterizations--model theory, fixpoint theory and proof theory.