On Logic and Moral Voice

Abstract

This paper explores some aspects of the concept 'logic' and its relation to moral voice, and argues that Menssen uses it too narrowly in her respone to Orr's "Just the Facts. Ma'am" and the work of Carol Gilligan. Grounded in the work of the later Wittgenstein, it is argued that formalized logic misses much of natural logic: the concept of 'moral talk' is developed to theorize Gilligan's ethic of care; it is argued that this form of moral deliberation is not argumentation in the formal sense; and the relationship between logic and epistemology is explored through the consideration of moral talk as a language-game which is woven into gendered forms of life. Finally, it is argued that the notion of a universal logic is the product of an oppressivc patriarchal culture and should not be defended by feminists.