Abstract
This special edition of Memory Studies is dedicated to the examination of Korean political memory. Many have called for studies to expand beyond memories in core global regions (Kim and Schwartz, 2010). Heeding that call, the researchers of the seven articles compiled for this edition address the dynamics of political and cultural memory within the context of contentious politics and ideological divides. The memories of regret, pride, and shame matter for the Korean people and the Korean states at least as much as, and perhaps more than, any other global region because of their particular circumstances regarding contemporary memory politics. Experiences of victimhood are central to Korean historical consciousness and Korean identity. These include the Japanese occupation (1910–1945), the Korean War (1950–1953), subsequent political corruption, and the distillation of historical experiences involving the superpowers’ undermining Korean interests and dignity (Schwartz and Kim, 2002). These memories are shaped by Korea’s peripheral position vis-a-vis the powerful core nations in domestic and international affairs. The lingering Cold War structure increases the precariousness of Korean memories. The peninsula remains the last Cold War frontier, the rest of the world having transcended the ideological rivalry two decades ago. The Communist North and the Capitalist South are still at war, with the 1953 armistice in effect. Upon Korea’s independence from Japan in 1945, the competition between the Soviet Union and the United States in East Asia led to a tense division on the Korean peninsula. The war ended only after the involvement of the United States, the Soviet Union, and China as well as the intervention of United Nations. An unsettled peace continues, with occasional provocations by the North Korean regime; the United States, China, and Japan still loom large in their hegemonic competition in the region. With the socialist North Korean regime in power, South Korea is internally split in its perception of North Korea and the United States. In the so-called South–South divide, support for North Korea is translated into an anti-US attitude, and vice versa. Progressives argue that helping the Kim Jong-il regime escape from international isolation is a way to build peace in the region, whereas conservatives prioritize domestic welfare and the US—Republic of Korea (ROK) alliance over inter-Korea reconciliation. They believe that the Pyongyang leadership will never abandon its nuclear ambitions and desire for unification under the Communist banner. As long as this Cold War–like division continues, historical perceptions are likely to swing with shifting political
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have