On Identifying and Identification

Abstract

The first aim of this paper is to sketch an account both of the process of identifying and of identifications, the results of the process. I treat identifications as sorts of files of information, or identification files. The role of identification files as devices for use in reidentification is central to my account. The process of identifying x is explained in terms of the perception of x and the formation of an identification file that has x as its topic. The topic is the entity the identification file is about. My proposal does not aspire to capture every aspect of the usage of ‘identification’ in ordinary philosophical discourse. ‘Identification’ is a theoretical term, as noted by G. Evans1. My proposal should be judged by its theoretical consequences. The second aim of this paper is to outline the way how the cognitive system (or mind) yields two remarkable kinds of correlation between identifications and topics: equivocal identifications (identifications with two or more topics) and, in addition, different identifications of the same topic. To illuminate the issue, I introduce the distinction between vertical and horizontal information connecting. I propose the notion of supermap as a useful metaphor for explaining the nature of information connecting by mind. Let me make a concise observation about thought and reference. I am providing an account of identification that aims to be serviceable for theories of thought and reference. It is plausible that a full theory of how a thought is about something rather than anything else needs some account of identification. What makes a thought be about a cer-