On Human Rights: Premises for a New Approach to Fundamental Social Rights

Abstract

From the point of view of international law, what we are seeking in this paper is to expose some of the premises for a (new) approach to fundamental social rights. If we think about the absolute supremacy of human life, a life that, to be understood as such, must be a life lived with dignity, we have to think about life from a material point of view and, therefore, in a priority status to the so-called «social» rights, since social rights (economic, social and cultural) address issues as basic to life and human dignity as food, health, shelter, work, education and water. With this understanding, it becomes very clear that the materiality of human dignity rests on the so-called «existential minimum», the hard kernel of social rights, in such a way that social rights are genuine (true) fundamental human rights. Recognition of social rights cannot be, therefore, a mere listing of good intentions on the part of the state. Social rights are fundamental rights, which are for all men, can be exercised by everyone and are essential to life and human dignity. What we are seeking in this paper, then, is to shed light on the understanding that social rights are fundamental human rights in international law.