Abstract

This chapter reveals different aspects of Amery’s intricate philosophical approach toward the problem of testimony. I tackle Amery’s dealing with this issue in light of three philosophical challenges: (a) testimony and the question of historical objectivity; (b) testimony and the reality of evil; and (c) the tension between testimony and the concept of moral kitsch, as well as the relation between testimony and the problem of the so-called universalization of the Holocaust.

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