Abstract

AbstractThis article explores the concept of intellectual humility, a crucial but undertreated dimension of Gregory of Nyssa's thought, first by focusing on a key section of Contra Eunomium II, and then by contrasting this account with contemporary versions of Kantian humility. While Gregorian and Kantian humility share similarities on the surface (e.g. both dwell on our inability to know the ‘essence’ of a thing), Gregory's vision of the virtue is formed through engagement with the biblical text and in the quest to know an infinite, self‐revealing God. In contrast to the flat resignation that characterizes Kantian versions of epistemic humility, Gregory's account of humility not only restrains but also empowers its practitioners in theological reflection.1

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