On Detection of False Data in Cooperative DC Microgrids—A Discordant Element Approach

Abstract

Though recent advancements in dc microgrids are largely based on distributed control strategies to enhance reliability and scalability, the absence of a centralized controller to check the global information makes these schemes highly susceptible to cyber attacks. Since false data injection attacks (FDIAs) are considered as a prominent attack methodology in dc microgrids, prior emphasis is usually laid on compromised sensors and controllers only related to dc voltages. Hence, this article first segregates the FDIAs on the output currents into destablization and deception attacks, based on the modeling of attack elements with respect to the consensus theory. Second, a discordant element based detection approach is designed to detect the attacked nodes accurately, using an extended analysis of the cooperative control network. A risk assessment framework for dc microgrids against cyber attacks is provided alongside all the case studies. An evaluation theory is also presented to assist the proposed detection scheme to differentiate between cyber attacks and faults. Further, the proposed detection approach is theoretically verified and validated using simulation and experimental conditions.