On Denoting Propositions and Facts

Abstract

In Denoting, Bertrand Russell maintains that the key to an understanding of denoting ordinary things is an analysis of the logical syntax of sentences containing the definite article 'the'. In somewhat the same vein, I think that the key to an analysis of denoting propositions and facts must be an analysis of the logical syntax of sentences containing the complementizer 'that', the word that forms that-clauses, such as 'that snow is white'. I But my conclusions are the opposite of Russell's. His insight was to reject the natural idea that combining 'the' with a common noun phrase yields a phrase, a definite description, that acts as a syntactic-semantic unit and refers to a thing. I defend the natural idea that combining 'that' with a sentence yields a phrase, a thatclause, that acts as a syntactic-semantic unit and refers to a proposition or fact. Treating that-clauses as units flies in the face of conventional practice of the last few decades of work in modal, epistemic, and deontic logic. In these enterprises, the role of the word 'that' is to adhere to a verb or adjective to produce an operator, such as 'It is possible that' or 'x knows that', the whole of which combines with sentences in non-truth functional ways. Russell, had he considered this view, would have said leaves that-clauses, by themselves, wholly devoid of meaning, but gives a meaning to every proposition in whose verbal expression they occur (paraphrased from On Denoting). This practice sees 'Mary believes that snow is white' as having the structure