On Comparison as a Practical Activity

Abstract

THE WARY WRITER COVERS HIMSELF IN ADVANCE AS BEST HE CAN against the most obvious lines of criticism. Let me say, therefore, that this article is not intended to break, or even blunt, a lance in the methodology debate of comparative politics, nor is it put forward as a contribution in its own right to the science of comparative politics. The intention is much simpler. I want to argue that there are practical forms of comparison which the political scientist can use when in a less than scientific mood and that useful ends can be served by such practical activity. What is offered here, then, is a series of personal reflections and no more. To prevent the appearance of scholarly intent, scholarly reference to the literature has been avoided. A plausible argument to forestall the critic, but probably sensible, is that the case for an unsophisticated approach to comparative politics should be presented in an unsophisticated way. Put another way, it may be that to be practical one should sometimes be naive.