On Collective Actions. Some Remarks on the Theory of Legal Actions

Abstract

In this paper the author deals with collegial judicial decisions as a form of human action. The scope is, however, limited to three questions: (1) What is the structure and the status of the general theory of action; (2) Is this theory applicable to such performative acts as judicial decisions; and finally, (3) Is it possible to speak about action in connection with collective agents such as collegial courts? The author defends the thesis that general theory of action as such is applicable to collective action, too, because the difficulty is not in the structure of that theory, or in its “individual character,” but specifically in the notion of “collective will.” This kind of “will” is epistemologically always a result of a political procedure, and speaking about the “collective will” presupposes the analysis of these procedures, because in practice they and only they formulate “collective motives,”“collective beliefs” and the like.