Abstract

Shortlisting of candidates—selecting a group of “best” candidates—is a special case of multiwinner elections. We provide the first in-depth study of the computational complexity of strategic voting for shortlisting based on the perhaps most basic voting rule in this scenario, ell -Bloc (every voter approves ell candidates). In particular, we investigate the influence of several different group evaluation functions (e.g., egalitarian versus utilitarian) and tie-breaking mechanisms modeling pessimistic and optimistic manipulators. Among other things, we conclude that in an egalitarian setting strategic voting may indeed be computationally intractable regardless of the tie-breaking rule. Altogether, we provide a fairly comprehensive picture of the computational complexity landscape of this scenario.

Highlights

  • Assume that a university wants to select the two favorite pieces in classical style to be played during the graduation ceremony

  • We focus on the family of -Bloc multiwinner voting rules, that is a family of scoring rules that assign, for each vote, one point to each of the top < |C| candidates

  • We show that -Bloc-F -eval-Coalitional Manipulation can be solved in polynomial time for any ∈ N, any eval ∈ { util, candegal }, and any tie-breaking rule

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Summary

Introduction

Assume that a university wants to select the two favorite pieces in classical style to be played during the graduation ceremony. The students were asked to submit their favorite pieces. A jury consisting of seven members (three juniors and four seniors). A preliminary version of this article appeared in the Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI ’17) [12]. In this full version we included all proofs and algorithms (together with our ILP formulations). We formalized the concept of simulation among tie-breaking rules

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Preliminaries
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Model for coalitional manipulation
Evaluating k‐egroups
We cannot simply use ordinal preferences
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Breaking ties
Limits of lexicographic tie‐breaking
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Complexity of tie‐breaking
Utilitarian and candidate‐wise egalitarian: tie‐breaking is easy
Egalitarian: being optimistic is hard
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Complexity of coalitional manipulation
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Utilitarian and candidate‐wise egalitarian: manipulation is tractable
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Egalitarian: manipulation is hard even for simple tie‐breaking
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Conclusion
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Findings
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Full Text
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