On Buddhist and Taoist Morality

Abstract

Arthur danto argues that all eastern philosophies – except confucianism – fail to accept necessary conditions on genuine morality: a robust notion of agency and that actions are praiseworthy only if performed voluntarily, in accordance with rules, and from motives based on the moral worth and well-being of others. but danto’s arguments fail: Neo-Taoism and Mohism satisfy these allegedly necessary constraints and Taoism and buddhism both posit moral reasons that fall outside the scope of danto’s allegedly necessary conditions on genuine morality. Thus, our initial reaction, that these eastern philosophies offer genuine moral reasons for action, is sustained rather than overturned. In Mysticism and Morality: Oriental Thought and Moral Philosophy, Arthur c. danto argues that necessary conditions on genuine morality include a robust notion of human moral agency and constraints that recognize that actions are praiseworthy (i.e., have positive moral worth) only if they are performed voluntarily, in accordance with explicitly moral rules, and out of a motive of concern for the moral worth and well-being of others. danto goes on to argue that all philosophical systems of the east, with the exception of confucianism, are primarily concerned with personal enlightenment and practices that enable one to escape from suffering, lacking these necessary conditions on genuine morality, none of them are able to support genuine moral theories. As we shall see, this is a gross and false generalization, and danto’s arguments stand in need of sharpening. Nevertheless, danto’s conclusion, that eastern philosophy has nothing to say to western ethical theorists, is still fairly widespread. It would seem that in order for contemporary western ethicists to take eastern contributions to moral theorizing seriously, danto’s views need decisive refutation. once these views are dismissed, it follows that eastern contributions to ethical theory may not be so easy to dismiss by western ethicists. foruM PhIlosoPhIcuM, pp. 99-110