Abstract
The paper investigates a dynamic Bertrand duopoly with differentiated goods in which boundedly rational firms apply a gradient adjustment mechanism to update their price in each period. The demand functions are derived from an underlying CES utility function. We investigate numerically the dynamical properties of the model. We consider two specific parameterizations for the CES function and study the Nash equilibrium and its local stability in the models. The general finding is that the Nash equilibrium becomes unstable as the speed of adjustment increases. The Nash equilibrium loses stability through a period-doubling bifurcation and the system eventually becomes chaotic either through a series of period-doubling bifurcations or after a Neimark–Sacker bifurcation.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
