On Benton's `Objective Interests and the Sociology of Power': A Critique

Abstract

Ted BENTON has presented an important and original analysis of the concept of power. 1 While I agree with both his critique of Lukes' transcendental value position, and his intention to conceptualize the reality of power apart from its exercise, I will question whether Benton's formulation is sufficiently realist. As Benton notes, Lukes defines power in terms of its exercise: 'A exercises power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B's interest. ^ Benton proposes the following modifications of Lukes: (a) the replacement of reference to B's interest with B's OBJECTIVES; (b) the bringing into account of A's objectives as well a recognition that 'power over' entails 'power to'; (c) a realist account of power which distinguishes the possession of power from its exercise. Benton thus proposes the following analyses of the concept of power: 1) 'A has the power to achieve A's objective' means 'A has capabilities and resources such that if A utilizes these abilities and resources, A will achieve A's objective (p. 175).' This can be expanded to cover cases of 'power over:' 2) 'A has capabilities and resources, and B has capabilities and resources, such that if A mobilizes A's capabilities and resources in pursuit of A's objectives, and B mobilizes B's capabilities and resources in pursuit of B's objectives, then A still achieves A's objective (p. 176).'