On being a discontinuous person: Ontological insecurity, the wounded storyteller and time in Daniel Keyes’s &lt;i&gt;Flowers for Algernon&lt;/i&gt;

Tony Ullyatt

doi:10.4102/lit.v36i1.1173

Abstract

This article explores ontological security and insecurity in Daniel Keyes’s novel, Flowers for Algernon. It opens with a very brief overview of the 1960s counter-culture to contextualise not only Keyes’s novel but also Laing’s theories of ontological (in)security. After a discussion of Laing’s concept of ontological security and insecurity, the focus shifts to Arthur W. Frank’s notions of the wounded storyteller and how Charlie Gordon’s entry into the medical world constitutes a colonisation of the body that brings with it a deepening sense of ontological insecurity. In entering the world of medical research, Charlie becomes the wounded storyteller, offering a first-person account of his experiences during the experiment and its aftermath. As the initial success of the surgery deteriorates steadily into failure, with the protagonist’s intelligence returning steadily to its pre-operation level, the question of time and how he can make the best use of it to record the experiment becomes paramount. The final section of the article centres on the growing link between the surgery’s failure and how it increases the protagonist’s ontological insecurity. He uses the diminishing amount of time available to him in search of understanding the fuller implications of the experiment. Eventually, he reverts to his initial rudimentary ontological security when he finds himself with the same intellectual level, as prior to the experiment.

Highlights

Affiliation: 1Research Unit: Languages and Literature in the South African Context, North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, South Africa
The final section of the article centres on the growing link between the surgery’s failure and how it increases the protagonist’s ontological insecurity. He uses the diminishing amount of time available to him in search of understanding the fuller implications of the experiment. He reverts to his initial rudimentary ontological security when he finds himself with the same intellectual level, as prior to the experiment
All were symptomatic that the cultural mainstream was heading in the wrong direction. (Watts 1997:vii; italics original)

Summary

Original Research

On being a discontinuous person: Ontological insecurity, the wounded storyteller and time in Daniel Keyes’s Flowers for Algernon. Later in The divided self, Laing (1990) expands upon the numerous elements involved in an individual’s ontological security: The individual, may experience his own being as real, alive, whole; as differentiated from the rest of the world in ordinary circumstances so clearly that his identity and autonomy are never in question; as a continuum in time; as having an inner consistency, substantiality, genuineness, and worth; as spatially co-extensive with the body; and, usually, as having begun in or around birth and liable to extinction with death. Charlie explains the cause of this ‘short circuit’ to Alice Kinnian by tracing it back to his mother’s behaviour during his early years The consequences of this discrepancy between intellect and emotion introduce another factor reinforcing Charlie’s ontological insecurity: ‘I realize that emotional problems can’t be solved as intellectual problems are. The dialogic nature of ontological security disturbs his sense of self-identity, of his ability to synthesise ‘... my looking at me with my view of others’ views of me’ (Laing 1990:5)

The wounded storyteller

The question of time

Conclusion