Abstract
The family of weighted Shapley values for cooperative n-person transferable utility games is studied. We assume first that the weights of the players are given exogenously and provide two axiomatic characterizations of the corresponding weighted Shapley value. Our first characterization is based on the classical axioms determining the Shapley value with the symmetry axiom replaced by a new postulate called the ω-mutual dependence. In our second axiomatization we use among other things the strong monotonicity property of Young (1985, Int. J. Game Theory 14, 65–72). Finally, we give a new axiomatic characterization of the family of all weighted Shapley values. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C71, D46.
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