Abstract
This work addresses a two-level discrete decision problem, a so-called Stackelberg strategic game in a Subset Sum setting. One of the players, the leader L, may alter the weights of some items, and a second player, the follower F, selects a solution in order to utilize a bounded resource in the best possible way. Finally, the leader receives a payoff which only depends on those items of its subset L that were included in the overall solution A, chosen by the follower. Complexity results and solution algorithms are presented for different variants of the leader problem.
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