Abstract
In this note familiarity is assumed with the papers in the symposium-The Logic of Knowledge and Belief-which appeared in the first issue of Nou's. Familiarity is also assumed with the subject of that symposium, i.e., Hintikka's classic work Knowledge and Belief. I do not look on this note as a rebuttal to Professor Hintikka's charitable and illuminating reply to my contribution to the Nous symposium. My intent is to raise certain questions concerning the system of epistemic logic outlined in Hintikka's paper Individuals, Possible Worlds, and Epistemic Logic. This system differs in some respects from that of the book Knowledge and Belief. I shall refer to the latter system as KB and the former as IPE. Some of the respects in which IPE differs from KB may be put in the following manner, I believe:
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