Abstract
A finite number of identical stores sell a homogeneous good to consumers with heterogeneous search costs who search sequentially with perfect recall and without replacement. Consumers' search rules are optimal with respect to the stores' pricing strategies, and consumers must visit a store to obtain information about its actual price. A symmetric Nash equilibrium (SNE) always exists. The model exhibits a variety of equilibrium behaviors between monopoly pricing and marginal-cost pricing. The competitiveness of a market depends crucially on the shape of the search cost distribution, moreso than on the number of competing firms.
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