Abstract

Carol Gilligan's work (1982) has been used uncritically to resolve gender-based rifts and ethical problems in social work. The author critiques Gilligan's psychological vision of gender and and normative ethics as an example of a theory that may con tribute inadvertently to the justifica tion, rather than to the transformation, of professional and societal roles. Fur ther, a feminist perspective is proposed that can serve as an alternative model for interpreting gender-based reality and that can provide an ethical and political framework encompassing guidelines for professional and societal intervention. THE RESURGENCE of the women's movement in the past two decades has renewed interest in various fields to review some persistent disciplinary issues through a feminist perspective. The awareness that gender may be one of the basic organizing principles in the structuring of professional problems has added a new dimension that has made gender itself the issue that must be ad dressed to achieve satisfactory solutions. Recent articles from the social work literature demonstrate the two-way benefit of applying a gender perspective to restructure old professional debates (Davis, 1985; Rhodes, 1985). Using Gilli gan's (1982) theory about the differences in moral development between men and women, these authors apply the gender framework creatively to analyze persis tent social work concerns such as the rift between practitioners and academic re searchers, dissatisfaction with the ascen dent form of research paradigm in the field, and conflict between the two moral traditions of rights and needs as an ethical base for the profession. Although the author applauds inquiry that can illuminate significant concerns of both women and the profession, she has serious concerns about the implica tions Rhodes (1985) and Davis (1985) draw about gender-based differences. In fact, because these articles present argu ments that are built on Gilligan's anal ysis, this author's unease starts with what an uncritical acceptance of Gilli gan's theory can mean for charting the course of the woman question and the social work profession. In this article, a feminist perspective on Gilligan's con ception of a different voice is pre sented to demonstrate its problematic application in developing a vision of gender in social work and society. Specifically, some of the main ideas and value imperatives of Gilligan's theory that should be scrutinized are outlined. Next, some reasons for the attractive ness and the inadequacies of these con cepts in the American and social work value systems will be discussed, par ticularly the inability of Gilligan's theory to provide strategies for gender-based transformation of professional and soci etal roles. The discussion is followed by a rationale for considering an alternative vision—a feminist rather than a strictly feminine vision—that can provide a pre scriptive rather than a descriptive model for restructuring professional and social reality. Finally, an argument is made that professional rifts that may be gender based might be narrowed more easily by adopting a paradigm that replaces, rather than preserves, a parallel struc ture with traditional sex-appropriate ac tivities and roles. This critique does not deny the exis tence of differences in general between the sexes. Rather, it attempts to demonstrate that ignoring the distinction between gender differences and gender stereotypes can lead the profession to embrace yet another theory that may hinder, rather than help, in hearing both female and male voices. Assumptions, Values, and Interpretations

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