Abstract

Price’s (Br J Philos Sci 42(2):157–176, 1991; 44(2):187–203, 1993 (with Peter Menzies); 2007, 2017) agency theory of causation has takes itself to provide a use-theory of our causal discourse. The theory’s aim is to describe the rules implicit to our linguistic behaviour when we describe things in causal terms. According to this theory, the rules governing our use of the concept of causation are based on our perspective as agents and our associated experiences of manipulating events. I argue that the observed relation between agency and our concept of causation cannot exhaustively describe the conditions under which we enter into causal discourse. In particular, I demonstrate that the agency theory faces familiar problems with accounting for causal ascriptions to token cases.

Highlights

  • Price’s (Br J Philos Sci 42(2):157–176, 1991; 44(2):187–203, 1993; 2007, 2017) agency theory of causation has takes itself to provide a use-theory of our causal discourse

  • Much of the philosophical discourse on causation concerns the metaphysics of the causal relation; but, Price’s (1991, 1993, 2007, 2017) agency theory of causation has occupied itself with providing an account of our causal discourse

  • Price’s (1991, 1992, 1993, 2017) agency theory takes this idea one step further; on his account, we call a cause a cause because it is an effective strategy for achieving its effect

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Summary

Introducing the Agency Theory

Much ink has been spilt on formalising this intuitive distinction, and the agency theory is best seen as part of this tradition. It begins with the idea most notably articulated in Cartwright (1979) that what distinguishes causal regularities from non-causal ones is that the former can be exploited by agents in order to achieve their ends. Price’s (1991, 1992, 1993 (with Peter Menzies), 2017) agency theory takes this idea one step further; on his account, we call a cause a cause because it is an effective strategy for achieving its effect. I will construct an explicitly use-theoretic version of the agency theory on Price’s behalf

Use-Theoretic Entry Rules
The Use-Theoretic Agency Theory
Simple Token Events
Preemption Cases
Probability-Lowering Causes
A Note on Future Events
A Problem for Everyone
Conclusion
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