Offensive Advantage in a Unipolar System

Abstract

Most of the previous chapters have discussed unipolar paradigms in which the weaker states have the initiative: they have the choice of balancing or bandwagoning. Those states seek alliances, while the unipolar power avoids commitment. Those states try to bind the unipolar power with international law, and the unipolar power resists. The unipolar power has choices of its own. Like all states, it seeks power; like all states, it seeks to make rational choices about how to gain power. The fundamental question for the unipolar power is whether or not its expected gains outweigh the expense of seeking more power—and whether or not the actions of other power-seeking states are likely to threaten its position. Most of the time, the answers to these questions are negative: it is difficult to gain power, and perhaps not worth much effort when you already have a large advantage over other states. This chapter develops and evaluates a hypothesis that during periods of defensive advantage, the unipolar power will bystand from most conflicts, to an even greater extent than states do under other configurations of power.