Abstract
ABSTRACT Sixteen years into the war on drugs, it is clear that Mexico’s armed forces are unable to solve their nation’s security crisis alone. There is need for an alternative security force capable of supplementing the military and facilitating its return to the barracks. Despite several attempts to create such forces, the military’s presence remains expansive. To understand why, I employ a multiagent model to analyze the relationships between the military, alternative security forces, and presidential administrations. I find the military benefited from cabinet-level representation, which gave its leaders unfiltered access to the president.
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