Abstract
AbstractTo date, no systematic attempt has been made to describe the main features of the Italian policy advisory system. In particular, we know very little about the role of political scientists within it. This study addresses precisely this gap in the literature. First, by presenting original data derived from an online survey to which 177 Italian political scientists responded, we reconstruct frequency, type, recipient(s), and areas of their (potential) policy advice. Second, by focusing on two very relevant policy processes—the approval of the so-calledItalicum(electoral law) and of the so-called Jobs Act (labour market reform)—we add insightful qualitative details to our quantitative analysis. Empirical results show that Italian political scientists are seldom engaged in policy advisory activities: many of them haveneverbeen. Moreover, there are no particular differences—from the point of view of personal characteristics (gender and level of academic career)—between policy advisors and the so-called pure academics. Finally, as the two case studies show, informal advice has the greatest impact on policymaking. This latter aspect reminds us of how much the Italian policy advisory system (PAS) is still poorly institutionalised and largely based on personal relationships as well as on political proximity.
Highlights
To date, no systematic attempt has been made to describe the main features of the Italian policy advisory system—with respect to its components, interactions, and dynamics (Halligan, 1995), or the stock of its analytical capacities (Howlett, 2009)
The ‘quasi-majoritarian turn’ that characterised the political system at the beginning of the 1990s affected the party system, starting a never-ending transition from multipartitism to a ‘fragmented bipolarism’ of coalition governments, the latter of which is challenged by new entrants, such as the 5-Star Movement and the League (Chiaramonte et al 2018)
The few studies of the Italian case conducted to date have focused on the composition of specific administrative branches, such as ministerial offices (Di Mascio & Natalini, 2016), with particular attention paid to political appointments and politicisation, rather than policy advice per se
Summary
No systematic attempt has been made to describe the main features of the Italian policy advisory system—with respect to its components, interactions, and dynamics (Halligan, 1995), or the stock of its analytical capacities (Howlett, 2009). In the so-called Second Italian Republic, the number of policy advisors who have been appointed due to their political affiliations (or at least, ideological affinity) is even higher than it was in the past (Di Mascio & Natalini, 2016). Against this backdrop, the Italian case shows scarce administrative capacity at the ministerial level, with legal expertise still prevailing (Capano & Gualmini, 2011; Ongaro, 2008; Capano & Vassallo, 2003; Di Mascio & Natalini, 2016). Ministerial cabinets developed in post-war Italy as large in-house institutionalised advisory structures designed to bypass the mistrusted senior civil servants; they play a central role in policy formulation and executive activities
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