Oedipus’s Responsibility: The Problem of Moral Luck According to Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel

Abstract

In mythology, Oedipus is impelled, by destiny or fate, to perform a set of actions. Given that he is not responsible for his fate or luck, is he responsible for his crimes? Can moral judgments be independent of luck, chance or fortune? Nagel suggests an example: two agents (with the same intentions, desires, beliefs, etc.) shoot someone. The first agent hits the target, the second agent does not hit it because, luckily, a bird crossed the path of the bullet fired. Both agents wanted to hit their targets, but by the interference of chance or luck only one of them hits it: do we judge both agents in the same way, morally speaking? It seems that the moral responsibility of an agent for his actions is inseparable from a principle of control of the agent over his actions. However, when we analyse the object of moral judgment (agents, actions), our assessment varies according to elements of luck (constitutive, circumstantial, resulting, causal). Does luck introduce a paradox into the core of moral judgments (Nagel's thesis), limiting the very concept of morality (as Williams argues)? In this paper, I argue for the need to evaluate agents and actions morally regardless of whether they are subjected to luck.