Oddness of the number of Nash equilibria: the case of polynomial payoff functions

Abstract

In 1971, Wilson (1971) proved that “almost all” finite games have an odd number of mixed Nash equilibria. Since then, several other proofs have been given, but always for mixed extensions of finite games. In this paper, we present a new oddness theorem for large classes of polynomial payoff functions and semi-algebraic sets of strategies. Additionally, we provide some applications to recent models of games on networks such that Patacchini-Zenou's model about juvenile delinquency and conformism (Patacchini and Zenou, 2012), Calvó-Armengol-Patacchini-Zenou's model about social networks in education (Calvó-Armengol et al., 2009), Konig-Liu-Zenou's model about R&D networks (König et al., 2019), Helsley-Zenou's model about social networks and interactions in cities (Helsley and Zenou, 2014).