Ockham and his Critics on: Intuitive Cognition

Abstract

ive is important, but not at all entirely lucid. He insists that these two cognitions are not distinct as to their objects; for, although abstracts from the existence of an can also occur in the absence of an object.15 They cannot be distinguished introspectively as psychologically distinct dispositions, for, as far as we are able to tell, they are of the same kind.16 The degree of certainty which may accompany these dispositions may be different, but says little about this. It seems that we may be just as certain about false existential judgments as we are about true ones, so certainty cannot be a criterion of distinction. The only distinction which seems to allow, then, is a purely formal one: can be the basis only for true existential judgments, is the basis for either false existential judgments, or of non-existential judgments. We will have cause to return to this distinction later, for it is the source of the criticisms of Ockham. In order to fill out the picture of Ockham's theory, we must sketch, very briefly, the relationship between and the propositions of scientific knowledge.17 As already remarked, indescribed as intuitively cognizing a non-existent object, so long as the existential (negative) judgment arising from this is true. I am not at all sure, of course, that this is what has in mind. 14For Ockham's account of the distinction between intuitive cognition and abstractive cognition see Boehner's edition of these sections of the Reportatio, op. cit., pages 248 through 249. 15Intuitive cannot occur, in the natural course of events, in the total non-existence of an object; although it can occur in the non—present existence of an object — then it is imperfect, however. As noted above, however, it is logically possible to have an in the total absence of an i.e. it is no part of the theoretical definition of intuitive cognition that there must be an object for any particular cognition. 19 Quodlibeta, V, 2, 5. 17 For a more complete account of this relationship, see T. K. Scott, Ockham on Evidence, Necessity, and Intuition, Journal of the History of Philosophy,