Occasionalism and the Cartesian Metaphysic of Motion*

Abstract

Occasionalism is often taken by historians of philosophy to have been an ad hoc hypothesis to establish the mind-body causal connections which on Cartesian principles are thought otherwise impossible. My aim in this paper is to show that this view is utterly without historical foundation, that, on the contrary, the view that only God can be a real cause of mind-body interaction was but a special case of a claim argued on grounds transcending the mind-body problem, and, what will be part of this, that the logical character of occasionalism anyhow precluded it from the role into which it was later miscast. More specifically, I shall show that occasionalism was but a consequence of the metaphysics adopted by the Cartesians in their general account of change. Though the same case could be made for the views of Clauberg and Geulincx, my concern will be with the occasionalism of Malebranche. My case here will be that his view is the historical and logical dénouement of principles more or less explicit both in Descartes and in two of his lesser known disciples, LaForge and Cordemoy.